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‘Catastrophic Failure’ Theories and Disaster Journalism: 
Evaluating Media Explanations of Australia’s Black Saturday 
Bushfires 
 




In recent decades, academic researchers of natural disasters and emergency management have 
developed a canonical literature on ‘catastrophe failure’ theories such as disaster responses 
from United States emergency management services (Drabek 2010; Quarantelli 1998) and the 
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant (Perrow 1999). This paper examines six influential 
theories from this field in an attempt to explore why Victoria’s disaster and emergency 
management response systems failed during Australia’s Black Saturday bushfires. How well, 
if at all, are these theories understood by journalists, disaster and emergency management 
planners, and policy makers? In examining the Country Fire Authority’s response to the fires, 
as well as the media's reportage of them, we use the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires as a 
theory-testing case study of failures in emergency management, preparation and planning. 
We conclude that journalists can learn important lessons from academics’ specialist 
knowledge about disaster and emergency management responses. 
  
Introduction: The Black Saturday bushfire in Australia as an ‘Extreme Weather Event’ 
 
In Australia, wildfires are known colloquially as bushfires. Because of southern Australia’s 
prevailing climate and vegetation types, bushfires can be severe (Bowman 2000) and are the 
‘extreme weather event’ that shapes Australia’s psyche (Fahey 2003, Campbell 2003). 
Devastating bushfires causing large numbers of fatalities have occurred regularly in 
Australian history. Historian Richard Evans observes that Black Saturday was only the most 
recent in a succession of ‘catastrophic’ bushfires in southern Australia: the Black Thursday 
fire in the Port Philip settlement (6 February 1851), Red Tuesday (1 February 1898), serious 
fires in 1919 and 1926, the Black Sunday fires of 14 February 1932, the Black Friday 
bushfires of 13 January 1939, Ash Wednesday (16 February 1983), and the Canberra 
bushfires of 2003 (Evans 2009: 105-121). This situates bushfires as ‘extreme weather events’ 
at the centre of two major socio-political debates in Australia: the cultural and history wars 
over the politics of memory, and concerns about anthropogenic or human factors in climate 
change. Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis (Beck 1999) broadly situates these debates. After 
the 2007-09 global financial crisis, governments and policy makers are interested in 
‘catastrophic’ risk models – that differs from linear or cumulative actuarial models, are 
discontinuous, and imply ‘order of magnitude’ consequences and severity (Banks 2005; 
Taleb 2005; Taleb 2007). 
 
The Black Saturday bushfires on February 7th 2009 devastated much of the Australian state 
of Victoria, claiming 173 lives, displacing 7,500 survivors, and destroying several small 
towns and hamlets in the forested hills north and north-west of Melbourne (Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission 2009: 33-82). Temperatures reached 47 degrees Celsius in 
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many parts of the state, accompanied by very low humidity and high winds in excess of 80 
kilometres an hour. In an internet page describing the weather event, Australia’s official 
weather agency notes that “maximum temperatures were up to 23 degrees above the February 
average, and for many centres it was the hottest day on record” (Bureau of Meteorology 
2010). 
 
In this paper, we analyse the intersection between six academic theories about ‘catastrophic 
failure’ and journalistic reportage about disasters. What can these theories tell us about Black 
Saturday and possible causal and risk factors for the bushfires? How well are these theories 
understood by journalists, planners and policy makers? Why is it important that journalists 
understand these theories, and how might this change future reportage? Some answers might 
lie in the extensive literature on the organisational sociology and emergency management of 
natural disasters (Drabek 2010; Drabek 2004; Dynes 2004; Tierney, Lindell and Perry 2001; 
Quarantelli 1998), of extreme events, and human judgment and decisions under uncertainty 
(Taleb 2005; Taleb 2007; Taleb 2008; Bazerman and Watkins 2004, Perrow 1999, Perrow 
2007, Moeller 1999; Sagan 1993; Vaughan 1996; Burns 2008). 
 
In examining Black Saturday responses, we found the media focused on four aspects: 
survivor accounts, critique of CFA leaders, historical analogies, and the perceived role of 
ecosystem and environmental factors. The data sample for our comparative theory-testing is 
limited to secondary analyses of newspaper reportage and survivor ‘long-form’ narratives 
(Muller and Gawenda 2009; O’Connor 2010; Kissane 2010; Clode 2010; Hughes 2009; 
Evans 2009). An in-depth analysis of the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission is 
beyond this paper’s scope, although we do consider some implications for how its testimony 
and recommendations might be interpreted. Crucially, Black Saturday involves the 
intersection of fires, human nature, history and risk (Kissane 2010: 31). We also examine the 
lessons for “social foresight” (Slaughter 2004) and how Black Saturday might reshape 
Australia’s politics of memory. 
 
Our most striking observation on Black Saturday reportage is the lack of deeper analysis by 
journalists of the bushfires’ causes and nature. Likewise, the Bushfires Royal Commission 
also detailed a deficient response by government officials, and disaster and emergency 
management planners. The most comprehensive survey of Black Saturday media coverage 
(Muller and Gawenda 2009) showed that journalists used a ‘social responsibility’ framework, 
emphasising empathy towards survivors. Later reportage adopted a legalistic approach on the 
Bushfires Royal Commission, in the adversarial style of post-Watergate liberal criticism of 
key decision-makers and institutions. Different normative theories of journalism can subtly 
shape broader media narratives about causal factors and organisational decision-making 
processes (Christians et al 2010; Cole and Harcup 2010). 
  
Six ‘Critical Failure’ Theories on the 2009 Black Saturday Bushfires 
 
The Royal Commission into the Black Saturday bushfires revealed many flaws in the 
response by authorities to the unfolding disaster (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 
2009: 229-260). Disaster and emergency management literature provides a coherent body of 
knowledge which may shed analytical insights on the salient causal and risk factors. Several 
dominant explanations exist across different levels of analysis, which highlight the uncertain 
interaction of events, knowledge, judgments and organisations during disaster responses. As 
Thomas Drabek (2010: 211) concludes, on the basis of several decades of emergency 
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management research, “disasters are non-routine social problems.”  
 
While there is an extensive debate in the specialist literature about their nature (Quarantelli 
1998), disasters have several characteristics: they are usually described as events, that may 
have been foreseeable (Bazerman and Watkins 2004); were foreseen by whistle-blowers yet 
not acted on; or are extreme events that lie outside human rational knowledge (Taleb 2007; 
Taleb 2008). A major reason for this ‘unknowable’ character of extreme events is the 
influence of Tverskey and Kahneman’s ‘prospect theory’ (1979) on cognition, biases, and 
decision heuristics about information (Burns 2008). Bushfires evoke ‘Extremistan’: the 
circumstances in which linear, predictive models of risk fail (Taleb 2007; Taleb 2008). Two 
organisational problems include ‘tightly-coupled’ systems that are too rigid to cope with 
complexity (Perrow 1999), and collaborative work cultures that become corrupt or deviant 
(Vaughan 1996). 
 
Scott D. Sagan (2003) uses comparative theory-testing to analyse and evaluate different 
theories. He contrasts High-Reliability Theories with ‘Normal Accident Theory’ (Perrow 
1999), on nuclear warnings and near accidents. We conduct a similar exercise using six 
influential theories. Our findings are initial, tentative, and open to further debate. 
 
1. Thomas Drabek: ‘Disasters Are Non-Routine Social Problems’ 
 
Thomas Drabek (2010 and 2004) has studied natural disasters and emergency management 
responses in the United States for more than four decades. Drabek’s theory of disasters 
emphasises the behavioural, psychological and social aspects of disaster response: the 
sociological and behavioural underpinnings of such phenomena as emergency evacuation, 
disaster communication, victim behaviour and volunteering. His research emphasises the 
mismatch between the policies and procedures of government authorities and emergency 
management agencies, and the behaviour of the citizens they are supposed to protect. 
 
Drabek details how many emergency management agencies often ignore key insights from 
the sociological literature when designing emergency warning systems. A recurring theme in 
disaster research is the unreliability of using telecommunications systems for warnings, 
because phone lines are quickly jammed by panicked friends and relatives trying to reach 
loved-ones. Like Drabek, the Bushfires Royal Commission found multiple breakdowns in the 
Country Fire Authority’s emergency warning and telecommunications systems on Black 
Saturday (Bushfires Royal Commission 2009: 155-172; Kissane 2010: 86-87).  
 
Drabek’s research findings directly concern the behaviour of citizens faced with the CFA’s 
policy of ‘Stay or Go’ evacuation decisions (Kissane 2010: 29). Drabek notes that people in 
these situations commonly seek confirmation of the threat situation before evacuating, 
attempt to depart as a family unit, or, if they are not physically together at the time of 
warning, try and account for all family members before leaving (Drabek 2010: 79). The 
media and policy debate about Victoria’s controversial ‘Stay or Go’ evacuation policy 
emphasised these behaviours. 
 
2. Nassim Nicholas Taleb: ‘Black Swans’ 
 
Taleb’s theories (2005 and 2007) are often misinterpreted in the narrow context of the 2007-
09 global financial crisis, but Taleb’s research program builds on David Hume, Karl Popper 
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and classical philosophers to contend that humans have limited knowledge and ‘judgment 
under uncertainty’. Humean ‘Black Swans’ are foreseeable outlier events. Taleb (2008) 
suggests that we normally inhabit the Gaussian reality of ‘Mediocristan’ in which risks may 
be predicted, controlled and managed; Taleb is more interested in ‘Extremistan’: the non-
Gaussian reality which reveals our biases and the inability of social institutions to quickly 
adapt. Taleb echoes Sagan (1993) and Drabek (2010) on the intersection of risk, complexity 
and organisational responsiveness. 
 
Initially, journalists and policy makers interpreted Black Saturday as one of Taleb’s Black 
Swans. Fire simulation expert Kevin Tolhurst and others reached more nuanced conclusions. 
For Tolhurst, crews faced “fire unpredictability” and then a “monster fire”, in which 
“massively long distance spotting” or contagion-like firestorms occurred, for the first time, 
between Mount Disappointment and Sugarloaf Ridge (Kissane 2010: 81, 114-115, 84, 132). 
CFA and crews had been trained in ‘Mediocristan’ situations and now faced an ‘Extremistan’ 
scenario unfolding. As Richard Evans later observed, “The fires exposed the limits of 
experience” (2009: 121). 
 
3. Susan Moeller: Event-Fitting and the “Hunt for the Perpetrators” 
 
Susan Moeller’s five-phase model of how the media reports on assassinations, terrorist 
attacks and disasters (1999: 169-173) illustrates how journalists uncover patterns and editors 
use event data to make decisions about coverage, photos, and layout. For Moeller, media 
coverage shifts from the initial event coverage, to more detail and policy maker reaction, then 
to a “hunt for the perpetrators”, and finally to public resolution, appointment of a successor, 
or closure. Moeller’s model fits how editors and journalists responded to the September 11 
terrorist attacks and also to Black Saturday. 
  
Moeller’s “hunt for the perpetrators” phase fits the Australian media's initial focus on the 
investigation of arsonists and the backlash against key decision-makers in the CFA and 
Victorian Police (Kissane 2010: 74). CFA boss Russell Rees and the Bushfire Reconstruction 
Authority’s chief Christine Nixon both later resigned, under considerable media pressure. 
Rees and Nixon were both widely criticised for their Bushfires Royal Commission testimony, 
and a perceived lack of leadership, priorities, and time management decisions – for example, 
Nixon’s decision to leave the minute-to-minute management of the fire response on February 
7th to subordinates, while she went to a hotel for a meal with friends.  
 
A similar public backlash occurred in the United States after September 11 and Hurricane 
Katrina. Journalists and editors had difficulty confronting the systemic failure of government 
institutions to cope with a domestic disaster. Ironically, Moeller and others suggest that 
media organisations with experience in reporting on foreign wars and international disaster 
zones may be more experienced, due to an ‘international bias’ of event framing and reportage 
(Baum and Groeling 2010).  
 
4. Charles Perrow: ‘Normal Accidents’ 
 
Perrow’s ‘Normal Accident Theory’ (1999: 363-364) offers a well-documented answer to 
Moeller’s ‘event fitting’. His study of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that accidents and 
failures are ‘normal’ in high-risk conditions. Aircraft, marine, and space accidents have a 
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higher probability of occurring when decision complexity is ‘tightly coupled’ with 
organisations in socio-technical systems. Consequently, NASA and NTSB have developed 
rigorous investigative protocols. 
 
Perrow’s thesis offers some highly persuasive explanations as to why communications and 
critical infrastructure failed on Black Saturday, notably in the Kilmore East fire. Perrow’s 
model of infrequent but predictable breakdowns of complex safety systems fits well with 
Australia’s repeated history of catastrophic bushfires causing multiple fatalities, and specific 
aspects of Perrow’s research, such as the tendency for organisational risk management 
systems to fail under the pressure of highly stressful events, saw uncanny echoes with the 
CFA’s inability to issue timely warnings to threatened citizens on the 7th February. However, 
Australian journalists seemed unfamiliar with Perrow’s influential work: they had 
‘rediscovered’ what risk sociologists had known for two decades. Perrow’s early work also 
stresses that institutions are prone to forgetting or ignoring safety lessons learnt from 
previous incidents, a factor which Commission found had occurred within the CFA. Had 
Perrow’s insights been followed, the CFA and the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre 
(IECC) that handled the crisis may have been organised in a more decentralised, redundant 
manner. Although the CFA and the public have advocated social network platforms like 
Twitter as a solution, these platforms can fail in crises (Burns and Eltham 2009). In later 
work, Perrow (2007) is even more explicit that so-called ‘natural’ disasters are usually built 
on ‘unnatural’ human civilisation. 
 
5. Diane Vaughan: The ‘Normalisation of Deviance’ 
 
Diane Vaughan’s work in organisational sociology has achieved a similar stature to Perrow 
and Taleb amongst academic researchers. Vaughan was deeply sceptical about the US 
Presidential Commission’s findings on NASA’s 1986 Challenger space shuttle disaster. She 
used historical ethnography to propose an alternative hypothesis that would deepen the 
public’s perception of risk factors (Vaughan 1996: 68-72). For Vaughan, Challenger went 
beyond the failure of O-ring seals and the launch decision: she argued that NASA was 
trapped in a scientific-bureaucratic approach to problem-solving, and faced publicity pressure 
because of civilian teacher and crew member Christa McAuliffe (Vaughan 2004: 114). 
 
Alongside Perrow (1999), Vaughan’s research observes that ‘knowable’ disasters do occur, 
because of institutional governance failures. Her findings echo Drabek (2010 and 2004) when 
discussing disaster and emergency management organisations. Yet Vaughan goes further: her 
critique of NASA and the US Presidential Commission anticipates the concerns levelled at 
the 9/11 Commission, Bushfires Royal Commission and other exercises that attempt to deal 
with Taleb’s ‘Extremistan’ (2007 and 2008). Unlike Moeller (1999), Vaughan warns that 
such exercises can shape public memories, and in doing so, obscure deeper causal, structural 
and systemic factors. 
 
6. Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins: ‘Predictable Surprises’ 
 
Bazerman and Watkins’ expertise lies in decision theory (2004) and how organisations can 
amplify individual biases. They consider problems in decision-making: secrecy, loss of 
institutional memory, silos, and rejected information. Journalists and policy makers tend to 
‘personalise’ particular leaders, as easily identifiable symbols of Perrow (1999) and 
Vaughan’s (1996) complex decision-making. 




Bazerman and Watkins (2004) find that individuals are prone to positive illusions and 
unrealistic optimism, a view shared by University of Tasmania’s Professor Douglas Paton in 
his Bushfires Royal Commission testimony (Bazerman and Watkins 2004: 74-77; Kissane 
2010: 32-33; Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010b: 56). Fire-fighting crews in 
Kinglake missed critical broadcasts on channel 55 because their radio was tuned instead to 
channel 54 (Kissane 2010: 175). The CFA’s ‘Stay or Go’ policy was designed for the very 
conditions where people make fatal miscalculations, such as to misjudge the ambient heat, 
smoke and speed of approaching bushfires. In parallel to ‘extreme weather events,’ Bazerman 
and Watkins find similar problems with emergency management responses in human 
disasters such as the 14 August 2003 blackout in New York (2004: 188-194). 
 
Four Lessons of ‘Catastrophe Failure’ Theories 
 
Collectively, these six ‘catastrophe failure’ theories point to a range of causal, decision, 
organisational judgment and risk factors that may explain why Victoria’s disaster and 
emergency services failed on Black Saturday. Drabek (2010) and Taleb (2007) establish the 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Vaughan (1996) and Perrow (1999) illustrate why 
organisations fail. Moeller (1999) captures how journalists and editors use crisis management 
routines. Bazerman and Watkins (2004) show that individual mistakes are amplified into 
repeated learning failures.  
 
Our analysis of Black Saturday using six ‘catastrophe failure’ theories suggests that theory-
testing can identify a range of possible causal factors and reasons that a single journalistic 
stance or normative theory can miss. To our knowledge, none of the Australian media 
coverage of the Black Saturday fire, or the fire’s aftermath and subsequent Royal 
Commission, mentions or engages with these systemic theories of natural disaster 
management. However, journalist Karen Kissane (2010) does raise many of the specific 
points that we mention, based on her detailed reportage of the Bushfires Royal Commission.   
 
Four key lessons stand out: (1) failures to learn from history; (2) the unanticipated effects of 
social policies; (3) inter-sectoral conflicts between different groups; and (4) the combination 
of diverse, long-term factors beyond individual control. As the ‘catastrophe failure’ theories 
note, these range across individual, organisational and inter-sectoral risk factors. Familiarity 
may facilitate a more nuanced journalistic culture, and a focus on the background to disaster 
and emergency management, rather than just the events and their aftermath. 
 
Survivors during Victoria’s Bushfires Royal Commission were adamant that current disaster 
and emergency planners failed to learn from history. This is ironic: the CFA owes its genesis 
to the Stretton Royal Commission after 1939’s Black Friday bushfires (Fahey 2004; Evans 
2009: 114; Kissane 2010: 38-39; Collins 2006). Critical infrastructure like fire refuges, which 
had been shown in past emergencies to save lives, were decommissioned or were derelict 
since 1983’s Ash Wednesday bushfires (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010b: 2). 
Unanticipated effects included how the geographic boundaries of local councils affected 
funding for emergency services, and the lack of clearly defined “defensible space” in the 
CFA’s ‘Stay or Go’ policy (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010b: 4-7). 
 
Inter-sectoral conflicts blamed for Black Saturday were foreshadowed by Canberra’s 2003 
bushfires which killed four people, and destroyed 500 homes and city infrastructure. 
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Journalistic accounts (Clack 2003) and the House of Representatives Select Committee on the 
Recent Australian Bushfires (2003) blamed several risk factors: inadequate national disaster 
and emergency response coordination, uncontrolled fires in national parks due to 
sustainability-oriented land managers, loss of institutional memory, poor morale in volunteer 
fire services, and an unprepared public. Black Saturday was an even more extreme event than 
the Canberra fires of 2003, and the risk factors in both cases reflected the six theories on why 
organisations often fail. 
 
Perrow (2007) and Murphy (2009) raised similar concerns about Canadian and United States 
experiences with ‘extreme weather events’ and decisions about built infrastructure. Long-
term factors are also beyond individual control: the influence of the Australian housing 
market on real estate investment in the rural-urban interface; clashes between 
environmentalists and farmers; and the influx of “tree-changers” or “sea-changers” due to 
demographic, employment and lifestyle changes (Kissane 2010: 15-18). These groups 
motivated inter-sectoral conflicts because of different governance, policy planning, and 
resource allocation objectives (Jacobs 1992). 
 
Implications for Journalists and Media Professionals 
 
Journalistic education has increasingly emphasised the role of ‘convergent’, ‘digital’, and 
‘citizen’ forms of journalism (Allen and Thorsen 2009, Evenson 2008, Quinn and Filak 
2005). Black Saturday has some important implications for journalists and media 
professionals. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Four Corners investigation (2009) 
highlighted the power of ‘convergent media’ via mobile phone footage of fires approaching 
Kinglake’s Kangaroo Ground Oval. Can ‘citizen journalists’ act as more than just ‘first 
responders’? How do non-professionals interact with government officials, planners, and 
communication experts? (Haddow and Haddow 2009) 
 
Perrow (1999) suggests technological solutions are also vulnerable during crises. Australian 
news media organisations are still far more conservative in using social media platforms, 
even compared with international conglomerates. Few real-time blogs existed of the 
Bushfires Royal Commission testimony. Recovery efforts coverage was also pretty thin. 
 
As Moeller (1999) demonstrates, journalists unfamiliar with disaster and emergency 
reportage none-the-less often follow crisis management routines. Muller and Gawenda’s 
extensive survey of bushfire reportage (2009) echoes Moeller’s findings. Crisis management 
routines, institutional practices and professional ethics helped journalists to frame their Black 
Saturday coverage, influenced how they conducted interviews and dealt with trauma and 
survivors, and affected what they decided to omit. 
 
Normative theories suggest a range of views far more nuanced than a simple dialectic 
between ‘citizen’ or ‘public’ journalism versus ‘corporatist’ media institutions, which we can 
use to situate the journalistic debate about Black Saturday (Christians et al 2009). Journalistic 
reportage is typically empathetic to bushfire victims and survivors, but adversarial to key 
decision makers such as fire and police commissioners whom the journalist or media 
institution deems to have made poor or negative decisions; this tendency overlaps with the 
adversarial tradition of post-Watergate investigative reportage. Media coverage is deferential 
to political institutions like the Bushfires Royal Commission, borrowing conventions from 
court reportage: expert witnesses, academics and public officials who editors believe have 
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social legitimacy. Tellingly, the Gold Walkley for 2009 – the top prize for Australian 
journalism – went to a survivor account of the bushfires by Gary Hughes (2009). In contrast, 
Karen Kissane's careful and detailed reportage of the Bushfires Royal Commission (2010) 
has to date received much less attention and critical praise.    
 
The six ‘critical failure’ theories we examine suggest different conclusions on how effective 
the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission may be in preparing Victorians for future, 
catastrophic bushfires. Moeller (1999) suggests they are crucial to restoring social order. 
Perrow (1999) and Vaughan (1996) are sceptical about institutional governance failures. 
Taleb (2007) and Bazerman and Watkins (2007) emphasise that misjudgements and ‘decision 
failures’ about ‘Extremistan’-like events will dominate media coverage, deflecting attention 
from the systemic failures and policy inertia that may in fact have contributed to citizens’ 
deaths. We argue that Australian journalists need more rigorous, investigative and 
academically-informed approaches, as adopted by US journalists after September 11 and 
Hurricane Katrina (Fink 2009), and less reliance on Commission-like hearings. 
 
Conclusions: Black Saturday - A Failure of Foresight? 
 
Was Black Saturday foreseeable - a failure of institutional foresight? Evidence on the public 
record suggests it was. The CSIRO (2003) and the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre 
warned of the possibility of catastrophic fires under the worst weather conditions (Lucas, 
Hennessy, Mills and Bathols 2007). Post-mortems after 1939’s Black Friday and 1983’s Ash 
Wednesday bushfires also warned of the potential for higher lethality and mortality rates. The 
Royal Commission discovered the CFA’s own fire expert, Dr. Kevin Tolhurst, gave prior 
warnings. The Age and Herald Sun newspapers, and Victorian Premier John Brumby all 
made explicit warnings on the morning of the tragedy. 
 
Foresight researcher Richard Slaughter’s view of the “fragmented” social capabilities of 
institutions (Slaughter 2004) parallels the post-Black Saturday reassessment of the CFA’s 
emergency response coordination. After World War II, the CFA adopted a ‘command and 
control’ structure that limited the autonomy of local incident controllers to release warnings, 
and that was conceived for month-long ‘campaign fires’ (Kissane 2010: 38, 54, 94-96). This 
contributed to ‘decision traps’ for the Kilmore East, Flowerdale, Kinglake, Strathewen and 
St. Andrews fires, in which critical communications, command and control infrastructure fell 
apart. Kilmore East’s fire was controlled by an officer that the CFA admitted was 
inadequately trained for large, complex incidents (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 
2010a: 72, 74, 109). Joint coordination between Kilmore East and Kinglake became 
impossible when both regions faced major fires (Kissane 2010: 167-168). Although the CFA 
and the Victorian Department of Sustainability & Environment (DSE) had established an 
Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (IECC), this institutional capability was 
overwhelmed in the ‘information cascade’ of Black Saturday events. Thus, the usual foresight 
practitioner solution of changing the strategic planning function and providing a recognition 
and scanning capability is not enough (Bazerman and Watkins 2004: 98-102). Although the 
media has crisis management routines for disasters (Moeller 1999), this also isn’t the 
institutional governance change that Perrow (1999) and Vaughan (1996) desire.  
 
Paradoxically, many individuals did foresee and prepare for Black Saturday, including local 
Community Fireguard groups. Instances have surfaced of prior warnings and ‘estimative 
forecasts’ that could have been heeded. These include DSE researcher Liam Fogerty’s email 
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of 3 February 2009, warning of a “catastrophic event” after examining meteorological 
forecasts and patterns (Kissane 2010: 43, 49-50, 62-63); the failure of SP AusNet’s electricity 
pole 39 at Kilmore East’s Pedabeen Spur at 11:45am on Black Saturday (Kissane 2010: 74); 
and the Urgent Threat Message for Kinglake issued at 4:10pm on Black Saturday, delayed by 
internal coordination problems, broadcast at 4:43pm on ABC radio and published online at 
5:55pm (Kissane 2010: 86-89, 170-171). “Small decisions” separated the survivors from 
bushfire victims, and that involved chance, hazard and luck (Kissane 2010: 144). 
 
We can learn from the experience of Kevin Tolhurst, the fire simulation expert in the IECC 
on Black Saturday (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2010a: 69-92). Tolhurst had 
predicted major fires and warned the CFA, and was at CFA headquarters actively forecasting 
the spread and severity of the Kilmore East fire on February 7. But his warnings never 
reached key fire controllers because of breakdowns in the CFA’s internal communications 
and decision-making processes (Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 2009: 256). Due to 
overcrowded office space, he was separated at CFA’s headquarters from the main situation 
room and from actionable real-time information.  Tolhurst was unable to gather the reliable 
on-the-ground information he needed for effective simulations of fire dynamics. Even though 
some individuals may have the expertise, tools and insights to make accurate forecasts, 
operational and institutional failures can render them irrelevant.  
 
The Politics of Memory: Why Media Understanding of Natural Disasters Matters 
 
Does it matter that Australian journalists seem unaware of academics’ specialist knowledge 
about disaster and emergency management responses? We argue that it does. Theory 
diffusion from expert academics to journalists and policy makers is an important yet 
overlooked intermediate stage. “Bushfire disaster came to seem like a bad memory,” historian 
Richard Evans observed (Evans 2009: 120). Black Saturday’s legacy may challenge 
Australian identity, urban modernity, and memory for decades.  
 
Black Saturday raises some deeper questions: How do we build a more bushfire-aware 
national culture? Do we need to actually change some of the foundational myths of 
Australian culture and national identity? Should there be similar remembrance traditions for 
victims of extreme weather events as for Gallipoli? In their absence, Evans warns, false 
knowledge may prevail: “A society which thought that it knew how to handle bushfires 
discovered that it was wrong.” (Evans 2009: 119) 
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